Telefonica O2 and e-Plus merger: MVNO access strengthens competition and wholesale and retail levels

Last week’s approval by the European Commission of the acquisition of e-Plus by Telefonica Deutschland (O2) became possible through concessions at wholesale level. Telefonica committed “to enter into capacity based wholesale agreements with one or several (up to three) Upfront Mobile Bitstream Access MVNOs (“Upfront MBA MVNOs”) in Germany prior to the closing of the merger.” This broadly follows the capacity based MVNO deal offered by Hutchison in Ireland to gain approval for its takeover of O2 Ireland.

Germany already has a vibrant MVNO market, not least as a result of the e-Plus multi-brand wholesale strategy. In regards to the wholesale markets, the Commission is satisfied that these MVNOs will not be harmed by reduced competition at network level. The existence of competitive MVNOs also acts as an insurance against unwarranted retail price hikes and hence alleviates the Commission’s concerns in the retail market.

The merger will take costs out of the mobile industry in Germany so shareholders will benefit. Telefonica Deutschland further committed to “make the following offers: (a) a spectrum offer consisting of the lease of 2×10 MHz in the 2.1 GHz band and of 2×10 MHz in the 2.6 GHz band; (b) a national roaming offer; (c) a divestiture of sites offer; (d) a passive radio network sharing offer; and (e) a sale of shops offer.” An Upfront MBA MVNOs might buy some spectrum. However, the Mobile Bitstream Access effectively provides access to capacity. There is little point in owning spectrum; indeed such a limited spectrum holding would make little sense without immediately entering into a spectrum sharing agreement with Telefónica Deutschland. There is little differences between this and the MBA MVNO arrangement.

Passive infrastructure sharing had been a feature of the German market for some time. Perhaps Vodafone Germany and T-Mobile will also look to increase the sharing of network resources, active and passive with each other and also with the merged Telefonica Deutschland and e-plus. Are we seeing the first steps of an evolution towards a national neutral host network with regulated wholesale prices?

With return of capital employed in the European mobile industry below that of some regulated utilities such as water and gas, investors may be better off by effectively pulling capital out of the mobile industry by means of outright consolidation or through sharing networks including spectrum, i.e. a “merger lite” strategy, becoming regulated utilities.

Noteworthy is that e-Plus was one of the four operators bidding for the 2x30MHz of digital dividend 800MHz spectrum in Germany which did not obtain any block. The outcome of the spectrum auction is likely to have been a factor in KPN’s decision to put e-Plus up for sale. In the next German spectrum auction only three operators will compete for spectrum, probably resulting in auction prices close to reserve prices. This is another reason for investors to be cheerful about the trend towards consolidation in the European mobile industry.

By Stefan Zehle, CEO, Coleago Consulting

Network sharing vs competition in the Czech Republic

Last week, Mobilnet.cz reported that Vodafone CR (Czech Republic) issued a complaint against the radio access network (RAN) sharing deal between Telefonica O2 CR and T-Mobile CR, stating that it breached a rule set down by the Czech Telecommunications Office (CTU) that such arrangements should not be exclusive. So either everyone gets invited to the RAN sharing party or there cannot be any RAN sharing at all.

Blocking a network sharing deal would be bad news for the two operators and ultimately also consumers because it will delay the availability of LTE and increase operator costs. However, allowing two parties to cooperate is likely to produce competitive advantage for the two shares and this is what Vodafone objects to.

The obvious solution is to open the deal to Vodafone as well. This would effectively herald the end of network based competition, at least at RAN level, which is where most of the network cost is. Network sharing is consolidation by stealth which flies under the radar of the EU Competition Commissioner. It is an effective way of taking costs out of the mobile industry.  If Telefonica O2 CR and T-Mobile CR invite Vodafone to the party this would remove the threat of scuppering the deal and may reduce total industry costs further. Return on capital employed could recover for all three operators, while consumers benefit from faster LTE roll-out and better LTE coverage.

By Stefan Zehle, CEO Coleago Consulting

New LTE Bands in European Version of iPhone 5S?

When back in September 2012, Apple launched the iPhone5, I commented on the fact that the Region 1 version (Europe and Africa) only included the 1800MHz band for LTE whereas Samsung and HTC already had triple band LTE models in the market with the 800MHz, 1800MHz and 2.6GHz bands.

This week came the announcement that Vodafone UK delayed its LTE launch to coincide with the launch of the iPhone 5S. This seems to indicate that that the new version of the iPhone will include three main Region 1 LTE bands.

It was reported that Vodafone’s Group CEO Vittorio Colao commented on the delayed launch: “End of the summer means when there’s going to be a good commercial moment for launching 4G … EE had a little bit of an advantage because of the iPhone at 1800MHz. To be honest that will go away as soon as we launch our 4G.”

The fact that Vodafone UK organised its launch date around a handset speaks volumes of the marketing power of Apple.  Many consumers make handset choices first and network choices second.  Mobile network operators would gain a lot from promoting Android and Windows phones to counteract the marketing power of Apple. 

Written by Stefan Zehle, CEO Coleago Consulting

Australian spectrum auction failure

The Australian 700MHz and 2.6GHz spectrum auction results were announced on the 7th of May. The most striking result is that 2x15MHz of the 700MHz spectrum remained unsold because VHA (Vodafone) decided not bid and Optus acquired only 2x10MHz. This poor result is due to the extremely high reserve prices. The reserve price for the 700MHz digital dividend spectrum was set at 1.36 $/MHz/pop. This is 186 per cent of the average price paid in other auctions for digital dividend spectrum as shown in the chart below. Furthermore, by comparison the reserve price for digital dividend spectrum in the recent auction in the UK was only 0.30 $/MHz/pop and in Germany the reserve price amounted to less than one cent / MHz / pop.

Digital Dividend Spectrum Price Paid vs. Australian Reserve

The rationale for freeing up spectrum from analogue TV for use by mobile broadband services is the benefit this brings to the economy.  At the start of the process of the digital switchover, the Australian Mobile Telecommunication Association (AMTA) engaged Spectrum Value Partners and Venture Consulting to determine the net economic benefit generated by redeploying the 700MHz spectrum freed up by the switch-off of analogue television, i.e. digital dividend.  They reported that:  “Allocating the optimal mix of UHF spectrum to mobile operators is forecast to generate a net benefit to the economy of between $7bn and $10bn, depending on which overall market scenario is realised. “ (Getting the most out of the digital dividend in Australia, Spectrum Value Partners and Venture Consulting, April 2009).

This estimate assumed that all of the digital dividend spectrum will be allocated to mobile.  In the event one third of the APT band plan 700MHz spectrum remains unsold whereas 100 per cent of the cost of freeing up the spectrum has been incurred. Therefore potentially several billion dollars of benefit to the economy has been lost as a result of setting reserve prices above the level where weaker operators can earn a normal return of capital employed.

The damage that has been inflicted on the Australian economy does not end there.  Since VHA ended up without spectrum it will further weaken their relevance in the market. Since competition is likely to have been weakened this will reduce the “consumer surplus” from the digital dividend i.e. the benefit consumers would gain in the form of lower prices.

Of course the most direct impact is the lower auction revenue for the Government. The Australian government budgeted in revenue from the auction at least equal to the total reserve, i.e. AS$ 2,894 million. In the event the auction raised only AS$ 1,964 million, i.e. 32 per cent below the target.

The auction failure could hardly be more complete.  Yet, it was widely predicted that with these high reserve prices spectrum would remain unsold, in fact Vodafone said it would not bid unless the reserve prices are lowered.  The outcome says a lot about politician’s lack of understanding of how investment decisions are made and also demonstrates an unwillingness to listen to the industry.

The blame for the ACMA’s auction fiasco lies mostly with the government since the reserve prices were set by Communications Minister Stephen Conroy who set out his stall in his now infamous declaration of “unfettered legal power” over telecommunications “The regulation of telecommunications powers in Australia is exclusively federal. That means I am in charge of spectrum auctions, and if I say to everyone in this room ‘if you want to bid in our spectrum auction you’d better wear red underpants on your head’, I’ve got some news for you. You’ll be wearing them on your head … I have unfettered legal power.”

Conroy clearly told everyone that he had no intention of listening to the industry. The reserve prices were set to plug the Government’s budget deficit. This is the worst way to set reserve prices for spectrum. It is devoid of any rationale and is in effect a hidden tax to be paid for by consumers in form of higher prices.

Although Australians are always good for a bit of fun, I very much doubt that bidders in the Australian spectrum auction wore red underpants on their heads. However, in the light of the spectrum auction fiasco, it is plausible that the Minister now wears a red face.

Written by Stefan Zehle, CEO Coleago Consulting

Vodafone’s takeover of C&WW

On 23rd April 2012, Vodafone announced an expected £1bn agreement to acquire Cable & Wireless Worldwide. The move by Vodafone might on the surface look like a strange purchase – why should a leading global mobile operator active in over 20 markets want to acquire a struggling UK focused business teleco with a large international IP network and carriers’ carrier business? There are a number of reasons why it makes sense:

• It reinforces Vodafone’s UK corporate market position as C&WW has a blue chip client list that is a who’s who of UK banks and retailers as well as the UK government. Vodafone will be able to extract synergies from rationalising its combined corporate sales team. The combination of Vodafone UK and CW&W will be the second biggest UK telco after BT.
• With mobile data traffic growing strongly, Vodafone will be able to use C&WW’s extensive UK fibre network to connect up its mobile base stations which will offer improved capacity and significantly lower operating costs. The company estimates that CW&W’s fibre network currently passes one third of its UK base stations. It will no longer need to rent as many high speed leased lines from BT or rely on lower capacity microwave links.
• Vodafone will attempt to use C&WWs 425,000km international network which links 150 countries to lower its international traffic costs although that might not be such a big advantage given the highly competitive nature of the international carriers’ carrier market. Alternatively Vodafone might sell this asset to another buyer keen to consolidate that market.
• Vodafone has (conservatively) stated that it does not think it will be able to use C&WW’s tax loss carrying forward, although it will benefit from its capital allowances which could go some way to making the deal self financing.

All in all it looks like a sensible bolt on acquisition and given that it represents a small fraction of the groups multi-billion pound free cash flow the risk is probably low. We expect that other smaller fixed line and DSL players in Europe could become acquisition targets for larger telecom players looking to extract synergies in mature markets where margins are under pressure.

Written by Scott McKenzie, Director, Coleago Consulting

The ferocity of the battle for the mobile wallet will keep competition in check

Project Oscar, the mobile wallet joint venture between Everything Everywhere, Vodafone and O2 has been referred to Brussels over fears that it will “stifle innovation” according to the Financial Times (13^th April, 2012). There is a fierce battle raging to define the standard for mobile payments and a key element of success in a standards war is first mover advantage. The mobile industry is often criticised for being slow moving and cumbersome so this referral and the ensuing lengthy probe is a cruel blow.

This is another example of the uneven battlefield in which operators have to compete compared to the Over The Top players such as Skype, WhatsApp, Facebook and Google. Competition for the mobile wallet is already intense with Google Wallet leading the charge but PayPal, Monetise and a range of other players are hot on their heels. It will not be long before Facebook joins the fray and many were surprised that the latest iPhone did not ship with Near Field Communications which would have opened the door to an iWallet – it surely will not be long however. Mobile operators are under intense competitive pressure from a wide range of OTT players who simply do not face the same level of regulation and scrutiny. Regulators and competition authorities need to take a wider perspective on the competitive landscape, if not they will be the ones stifling the innovation and competition they are so anxious to promote.

Written by Graham Friend, Managing Director, Coleago Consulting